This paper deals with the computation and analysis of some fundamental reserve aggregates and associated monetary statistics which impart important information regarding the design and conduct of monetary policy at the State Bank of Pakistan. Specifically, we compute the data series for borrowed, unborrowed, free and drainable reserves using balance sheet data published by the State Bank of Pakistan for the period 1985-2009. Results show that Pakistan's monetary policy revolves around managing the exchange rate while using the tbill rate as the key policy instrument. However, the value of the t-bill rate is both incorrectly and sub-optimally related to macroeconomic fundamentals rendering monetary policy time inconsistent. This hinges on the finding that since 2000-01, State Bank of Pakistan is targeting net free reserves of the banking system at 4% of total private deposits. Among other observations, we find that the scope of open market operations as a tool of monetary policy remains but limited and that this limited role of open market defenses derives from an indiscreet concern of the central bank to sterilize its own foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, the growth rate of unborrowed plus drainable reserves bears a strong negative correlation with the annual average rate of inflation, which, on account of the former being consistently negative since 2005, implies that the government and the State Bank of Pakistan both have absolutely no concern for controlling inflation.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the computation, presentation and analysis of some fundamental reserve aggregates and associated monetary statistics for Pakistan that the State Bank of Pakistan does not explicitly publish (or even make any reference to in policy discussions) but which, nevertheless, impart important information regarding the design and conduct of monetary policy at the State Bank of Pakistan.
Our analysis originates in the fundamental question as to what drives monetary policy at the State Bank of Pakistan (hereafter referred as SBP). The SBP describes its policy as a set of discretionary measures that it implements as and when it deems necessary and which derive from a detailed review of the state of the economy, the practices of the banking system and the statement of objectives of monetary policy (See e.g. State Bank of Pakistan, 2009a Pakistan, , 2009b . In stark contrast to the claims of the SBP, we find that changes in t-bill rate are systematically related to the rate of growth of national output; the rate of inflation and the currency depreciation rate 1 . This implies that the SBP is implicitly subscribing to a Taylor type rule (see Taylor, 1993 Taylor, , 1998 which, quite unusually, dictates it to (i) raise the t-bill rate when output growth declines (Malik and Ahmad, 2007 also observe the same) and to (ii) raise the t-bill rate when inflation increases (only in the long run) but by less than the amount of increase in inflation. This situation is further riddled by the SBP's claim that changes in t-bill rate do not necessarily reflect changes in monetary policy and that the key monetary policy instrument at the SBP is the discount rate (State
Bank of Pakistan, 2009b).
The design and conduct of monetary policy, apart from the standard procedure of determining objectives, setting quantitative targets, choosing instruments and ascertaining the 1 The policy rule equation referred to here states that:
( ) ( ) Rate that is consistent with the fundamental equation of monetary policy (see Bindseil (2004) for a detailed rationale and description of the policy equation).
The question as to whether the operational target of monetary policy should be a reserve variable (as suggested by the Reserve Position Doctrine) or an interest rate variable (that constitutes recent practice at many central banks) happened to be the subject of a long standing debate in monetary policy making until the recent past (see Bindseil, 2004) . Since SBP has never officially subscribed to either of these positions, and since it actively denies subscribing to a Taylor-type rule, therefore, we construct the reserve aggregates for Pakistan to ascertain the operational basis of its monetary policy. Specifically, we use the balance sheet data of the SBP and the banking system to construct the various reserve variables like free reserves, borrowed reserves and unborrowed reserves in conjunction with the reserve equation to determine the operational targets of monetary policy that have been used by the SBP over the past. Since, from a purely technical viewpoint, operational targets specified in terms of interest rates may be translated in terms of reserve targets and vice-versa by making 
II. RESERVE EQUATION AND THE ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POLICY
Treasury currency is defined as currency issued by the federal government in the form of 
E-06
In order to determine these variables empirically, we need to look at the consolidated balance sheets of the SBP and the commercial banks. Table 3 shows a schematic representation of the balance sheet of the scheduled banks in Pakistan. The balance sheet may be written in equation form as:
The banking system's balance sheet identity states that the sum total of demand and time ( )
Finally, subtracting treasury currency, unborrowed reserves and borrowed reserves from the total quantity of reserve money (equation E-05), we get data on the factor A that represents all other sources less all other uses of reserves 10 . The reserve equation hence gets empirically determined. Combining the above results, we can write the complete reserve equation as:
Canceling out excess reserves and vault cash on both sides, we get: The State Bank of Pakistan publishes data on borrowed reserves (advances from State Bank of Pakistan), excess reserves, vault cash (cash in tills of banks), one rupee and above coins, subsidiary coins and other deposits. The volume of treasury currency, borrowed reserves and free reserves is therefore known with certainty. However, the data on unborrowed reserves is not published in readily usable format. We derive it using the definition in E-08. To the extent that unborrowed reserves are over/under estimated (because of non-availability of further disaggregated data that may need a re-categorization), the factor A will need to be counter adjusted. However, we expect that this adjustment would be of a much smaller magnitude to make any significant analytical differences for our analysis.
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Using E-04, E-06 and E-08, we get: whether it works through open market or discount operations (in the short run) or through reserve requirement setting (in the long run) can therefore be directly evaluated by making use of this identity.
II (B) Reserve Equation and the Analytics of Monetary Policy
The various definitions of money supply used by the State Bank of Pakistan read:
The reserve equation (E-10) and the demand definition of money supply (first part of E-11) together with the assumptions that (i) the ratio of currency (including other deposits) to money supply is stable and predictable and that (ii) required reserves are linked to deposits via the reserve requirement ratio, generate the definition of the reserve multiplier. Defining
, we can write this relationship as:
E-12
The money supply model in equation E-12, links money supply ( through its discount and standing facilities operations. Proponents of the reserve approach to money supply believe that once the quantity of unborrowed and free reserves is determined, the level of private deposits can be determined residually by making use of the expression:
The ratio of unborrowed reserves and free reserves to total private deposits, therefore, describes nothing else but monetary policy.
Finally, using equations E-01 and the last component of E-11, and defining This identity is the total differential of equation E-10 while holding currency in circulation constant. The differentials appearing in the expression are behaviorally related to the bank deposits and the various interest rates, thereby also getting cross linked to one another. Thus, e.g., when free reserves or unborrowed reserves change, they also cause a change in bank deposits exerting a second round indirect influence on required reserves (see Meigs, 1962 ) for a detailed discussion of these concepts). Casting out all of these differentials in terms of their relationship with bank deposits and then inverting this functional relationship, we get the result that bank deposits are residually determined through this identity. Clark and Kwack (1976) also derive the same result in a slightly different context. is simply a reprint of different data series from the sources listed above. Table 5 (c) illustrates data on the sources of reserve money constructed in concordance with equation E-06. This completes one part of the tasks that we set ourselves in this paper. This data set is then used to construct the time profile of the unborrowed, free and drainable reserve ratios, the ratio of broad money to unborrowed reserves, the endogenous and exogenous components of reserve money, the total volume of discretionary open market operation instruments along with its growth rate, the difference between the unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios in comparison with the t-bill rate, the reserve multiplier in comparison with the simple money multiplier, the breakup of the simple money multiplier into its domestic and foreign components, and the growth rate of unborrowed reserves alongside the rate of inflation. The graphs are sufficient evidence to the fact that the SBP is doing much that is unneeded and neglecting a lot while making monetary policy. Since the strategy of SBP's open market operations reclines in counter balancing its own net foreign assets, therefore it becomes obvious that the SBP is deeply concerned with managing the exchange rate, quite in contrast with its publicly held opinion that it is not doing so.
To demonstrate the flaw of this strategy, we compare the simple money multiplier with the reserve multiplier. We find that the difference between the two multipliers averaged at 0.3 before 1991 and at approximately 0.7 since then. One is thus forced to believe that the foreign currency denominated private deposit accounts allowed in 1991 have something to do with this difference. Mirakhor and Zaidi (2004) observe that as per SBP policy requirement, commercial banks are required to sell the foreign exchange deposited with them to SBP at a premium at the end of each working day. This implies that the SBP supplies extra short term excess reserves for the banking system, thereby enabling them to disburse more credit if and when required than would otherwise be possible for the banking system. Thus, while the SBP continues to believe that the banking system can transform every rupee of reserve money into (about) three rupees of broad money, the banking system actually translates it into four rupees 13 . The open market operations strategy of the SBP lends further support to this endogenous credit expansion. Comparing the domestic and the foreign asset components of the money multiplier, we find that the former is much larger in magnitude as compared to the latter. Still, the SBP is more concerned with draining away these foreign assets (as discussed above) rather than mopping away domestic liquidity. The domestic asset multiplier averaged at a value of 4 between 1991 and 2002. The same increased to an average value of 17 12 This idea has been fully elucidated in the author's dissertation. The historical origins of the same can be traced back to the concept of the liquidity definition of balance of payments. Some useful discussions of the same can be found in McKinnon (1969) and Knoester (1979) . 13 The primary factor underlying this difference happens to be the way excess reserves are accounted for by the monetary authority and the monetary system. While the monetary authority needs to add excess reserves to form the reserve money aggregate (equation E-02), the monetary system treats excess reserves (net of discount borrowings) as a crunch on its reserve base (equations E-09 and E-10). Thus reserve money increases in volume as excess reserves increase, but the reserve base of the banking system shrinks and hence a quantitatively larger multiplier value is obtained (the close association between the difference of the two multipliers and the free reserve to deposit ratio supports this intuition). That the SBP's open market operations strategy derives from some ill-founded concerns becomes evident when we look at the graph that shows the difference between the unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios along side the t-bill rate. The difference between the unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios indicates nothing else but optimal open market operations (see Toporowski, 2006) . Hence, we expect the t-bill rate to be the replica of this graph. However, we find that at the SBP, the two become same only when we plot the lagged value of the t-bill rate (which is an annual average) alongside the reserve difference. The monetary policy strategy at the SBP is thus seen to be lagging behind in time, indicating again that the bank takes about six month's time to know what is happening in the economy and the money market. Viewed from another perspective, since the t-bill rate does not match the difference between the unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios in the current time period, therefore, monetary policy may well be identified as time inconsistent (this may be one interpretation of why the output coefficient in our estimated Taylor rule equation is negative).
The unabated conclusions that this discussion points to, is that the SBP is (i) speciously using open market operations to balance changes in earned foreign exchange assets and its own business initiatives, thereby trivializing the t-bill rate, (ii) fabricating a time-inconsistent monetary policy owing to a one year lag in taking the t-bill rate to its optimal level, (iii) The ultimate control over inflation and currency depreciation comes from the answer as to how costly it is for the system to increase any (or both) of them. These costs are leveraged by the levels of domestic public debt holdings and external reserves. Thus, for example, if the government holds a large volume of outstanding public debt, inflation would be very costly in that it will eventually increase the service cost of this debt to the government. Similarly, a large volume of external indebtedness (or foreign reserve holdings) will make currency depreciation difficult for the central bank, because it would then increase its service costs (or reduce the value of reserves) over and above the expected gains from increased exports. It follows that a strategy of increasing the exogenous component of money supply and accumulating foreign exchange reserves is sufficient to induce control over inflation and the currency exchange rate. The falling level of the sum of unborrowed and drainable reserves (which constitute the exogenous component of money supply) is therefore evidence to the fact that the State Bank of Pakistan and the government both are absolutely hesitant to control inflation. SBP is actually using the discount rate as an anchor for conducting monetary policy 17 . The steady state value of this anchor does not derive from any known estimates of the productivity of the domestic capital stock. Rather, its value is kept close to the t-bill rate, and not contrariwise (because announcements regarding the discount rate are always accommodative and have lagged behind changes in the inter-bank money market rate, only to allow more room for its variability; see SBP's various monetary policy statements at http://www.sbp.org.pk), which itself derives from some concern with managing the nominal exchange rate. This implies that the true descriptor of SBP's monetary policy is the t-bill rate, which is but incorrectly related with inflation and output levels.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper dealt with the computation and analysis of some fundamental reserve aggregates and associated monetary statistics that the SBP does not publish or take into account but which impart important information regarding the design and conduct of monetary policy at the SBP. Specifically, we computed the data series for borrowed, unborrowed, free and 15 Meigs argued that (i) a given level of free reserves may be associated with different levels of money growth and deposit expansion, (ii) equal volumes of free reserves in different periods do not imply same bank behavior, (iii) changes in free reserve levels are inappropriate indicators of tight/easy monetary policy, and (iv) free reserves targets are self defeating (see Meigs, 1962 for details) 16 We call this strategy spontaneous because the State Bank of Pakistan has never explained as to whether any of these reserves, unborrowed or free, are inelastic or contrariwise (as suggested by Gordon and Leeper (1997) ) to the corresponding rate of interest. In fact, since the t-bill rate was constant during the 1980's and only a white noise averaging at 12.5 percent during 1990's therefore unborrowed reserve were perfectly elastic to the rate of interest. Similarly, the net free reserves ratio appears to be positively correlated with the discount rate since 2001. 
